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Lecture 
AN ETHICAL MANIFESTO FOR PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS† 
Monroe H. Freedman* 
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a 
man gets depends on the amount of money he has.1 
The basic rule that must guide every lawyer is that the 
lawyer’s total loyalty is due each client in each case.2 
In 1961, Clarence Earl Gideon was charged by the State of Florida 
with the felony of entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a 
misdemeanor.  At the beginning of his trial, Gideon asked for a lawyer to 
represent him, but his request was denied.  Forced to conduct his own 
trial, Gideon was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. 
In response to Gideon’s subsequent habeas corpus petition, the 
Supreme Court held that before a state can imprison an indigent person 
as a felon, due process requires that the state provide him with “the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”3  
For without that guiding hand of counsel, the Court recognized, “though 
[the accused] be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he 
does not know how to establish his innocence.”4 
Anthony Lewis celebrated the decision in Gideon’s case in his 
masterful book, Gideon’s Trumpet.  The celebration, however, was 
premature, because the constitutional ideal is too often betrayed by 
courtroom realities.  As Stephen Bright, Director of the Southern Center 
for Human Rights has said, “No constitutional right is celebrated so 
                                                          
† I use “Manifesto” in the dual sense of a declaration of fundamental principles and a 
call to action. 
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School.  Author (with Abbe Smith), 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (3d ed., 2004). 
1 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
2 ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function, 4-3.5, Commentary (emphasis 
added). 
3 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 68 (1932)); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (holding that counsel is 
constitutionally required in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is a possible 
sentence). 
4 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. 
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much in the abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to 
counsel.”5 
One way the states have purported to meet their constitutional 
obligation to provide counsel to poor people accused of crimes has been 
through court-appointed lawyers.  However, the paltry compensation 
paid for these services has generally been inadequate to attract 
competent lawyers.6  In addition, judges have too often selected court-
appointed lawyers precisely because the lawyers are incompetent, and 
can be counted on to move the courts’ calendars quickly by entering 
hasty guilty pleas in virtually all cases.7  In those few cases in which the 
accused insists on his right to trial by jury, the trials typically move 
rapidly because the court-appointed lawyers generally file no motions, 
conduct no investigations, and do little to impede the speedy disposal of 
the case from charge, to guilty verdict, to imprisonment.8 
For example, an extensive study under the auspices of NYU Law 
School’s Center for Research in Crime and Justice found that New York’s 
court-appointed lawyer system has failed to provide any semblance of 
effective assistance of counsel to indigent defendants.9  The lawyers are 
paid on the basis of vouchers for the time spent on each case.  There is 
therefore every incentive for the lawyers to record faithfully, if not to 
                                                          
5 Stephen B. Bright, Gideon’s Reality: After Four Decades, Where Are We? CRIM. JUST. 5 
(Summer, 2003); DEBORAH L. RHODE, Presumed Guilty: Class Injustice in Criminal Justice, in 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal 
Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003). 
6 Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Process, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1386-1388 (2004); RHODE, supra note 5, Ch. 6; Bright, supra note 5, at 
5; The Spangenberg Group, Rates of Compensation Paid to Court Appointed Counsel in Non-
Felony Cases at Trial: A State-by-State Overview (ABA, 2003); ABA, Criminal Justice in Crisis: A 
Report to the American People and the American Bar on Criminal Justice in the United States:  
Some Myths, Some Realities, and Some questions for the Future 5 (1988) [hereinafter ABA, 
Criminal Justice in Crisis]; ABA, Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Quest for Equal Justice 
(2004) [hereinafter Gideon’s Broken Promise]. 
7 Klein, supra note 6 passim.  The study I am relying on was conducted in 1988, but 
nothing has changed.  See Thomas F. Liotti, Does Gideon Still Make a Difference? 2 N.Y. CITY 
L. REV. 105 (1998); Editorial, Poor Defendants, Poor Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 23, 2002. 
8 There are, of course, a minority of court-appointed lawyers who provide highly 
competent and zealous representation.  One example is Abe Fortas, who was appointed by 
the Supreme Court to represent Clarence Gideon in his appeal.  However, those lawyers 
are likely to be among those who recognize that the generality of court-appointed lawyers 
do not provide competent representation. 
9 See, e.g., Chester Mirsky & M. McConville, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York 
City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1987).  This research was conducted in 1987, 
but there is no reason to believe that circumstances have changed—at least not for the 
better—since that time. 
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exaggerate, the time they have spent.  Yet the vouchers reveal the 
following statistics: 
Interviewing and counseling 
No time recorded for interviewing and counseling the 
client in 75% of the homicide cases, or in 82% of other 
felony cases;10 
Discovery 
No time recorded for discovery in 92% of the homicide 
cases or in 93.6% of other felony cases;11 
Investigation 
No time recorded for investigations in 72.8% of the 
homicide cases or in 87.8% of other felonies;12 and 
Pre-Trial Motions 
No time recorded for written pre-trial motions in 74.5% 
of the homicide cases or in 80.4% of other felonies;13 
The same study nevertheless concluded that this system of court-
appointed lawyers “must be understood as a success from the 
perspective of those who designed the system and now maintain it,” that 
is, “to make the criminal law a more effective means for securing social 
control at minimal expense to the state and to the private bar . . . by 
compelling guilty pleas and by other non-trial dispositions.”14 
The other means of providing lawyers to poor people has been 
through public defender and legal aid offices.15  There, the problem has 
been not so much the incompetence of the lawyers, but the fact that the 
offices typically are seriously underfunded.  This has produced 
                                                          
10 Id. at 758. 
11 Id. at 761. 
12 Id. at 762. 
13 Id. at 767. 
14 Id. at 876-77, 902. 
15 Legal aid offices are private organizations that contract with the government to 
provide legal assistance to poor people; public defenders, like prosecutors, are funded 
directly by the government. 
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overloading of the individual lawyers with far more clients than any 
lawyer could competently represent.16 
Prior to Gideon, for example, the New York City Legal Aid Society 
“pioneered a prosecutorial method of extracting guilty pleas.”17  After 
Gideon, the Society could no longer “explicitly support this non-
adversarial model of criminal defense.”18  However, despite a series of 
unsuccessful strikes by Legal Aid lawyers attempting to improve the 
legal services being provided, the City and the Society have succeeded in 
forcing the lawyers to maintain, in most respects, the pre-Gideon style of 
non-adversarial representation.19 
This wide-spread, chronic problem20 has produced a serious, 
scholarly suggestion that public defenders engage in systematized triage.  
John B. Mitchell, a dedicated and experienced criminal defense lawyer 
and clinical law professor,21 has proposed that we “redefine the Sixth 
Amendment” to allow public defenders to engage in triage, that is, to 
routinely decide which cases should receive full representation and 
which should receive only cursory attention.22  Mitchell’s article is 
particularly distressing because it is thoughtful, erudite, and well-
written. 
Mitchell begins with the depressing but undeniable reality that 
public defenders are already rationing their resources among clients, 
deciding which clients they will fight for and which clients will be 
denied effective assistance.23  His concern is that these decisions are 
being made “randomly and haphazardly, if at all.”24  He proposes 
instead “an ethics of reality”25—what he claims to be “a coherent, ethical 
                                                          
16 “The entire criminal justice system is starved for resources.” ABA, Criminal Justice in 
Crisis, supra note 6; ABA, Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 6.  The explicit reference is to 
both federal and state jurisdictions. 
17 Mirsky & McConville, supra note 9, at 894. 
18 Id. at 894 (emphasis added). 
19 Id. at 894-99. 
20 See supra note 9. 
21 Mitchell previously wrote one of the most important articles in the field of criminal 
justice.  See John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers to Old 
Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1980). 
22 John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215 (1994).  
Mitchell directs his argument to the representation of defendants in the lower criminal 
courts; as a practical matter, however, it applies no less to lawyers handling major felony 
cases. 
23 Id. at 1220. 
24 Id. at 1222. 
25 Id. at 1222 n.27. 
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approach” for deciding which clients will receive the lawyer’s full 
representation (“focus”) and which will receive perfunctory attention 
(“pattern representation”). 
As Mitchell defines these terms, focus representation “roughly 
approximates the effort one would expect from a good attorney with a 
reasonable caseload,” while pattern representation means hastily 
categorizing cases factually and legally by reference to previous, 
apparently similar, cases.26  As Mitchell acknowledges, “[w]ith the high 
volume of cases, [these] triage decisions must be made quickly, with 
relatively minimal information.”27 
Ironically, this description of pattern representation is strikingly 
similar to the inquisitorial system of judging, as criticized in an article 
written by Professor Lon Fuller and adopted by a Joint Conference of the 
ABA and the AALS.28  As Fuller explained, the problem with an 
inquisitorial system is precisely the pattern approach by judges that 
Mitchell urges public defenders to adopt: 
What generally occurs in practice is that at some early 
point a familiar pattern will seem to emerge from the 
evidence; an accustomed label is waiting for the case, 
and without awaiting further proofs, this label is 
promptly assigned to it.  It is a mistake to suppose that 
this premature cataloguing must necessarily result from 
impatience, prejudice or mental sloth.  Often it proceeds 
from an understandable desire to bring the hearing into 
some order and coherence, for without some tentative 
theory of the case there is no standard of relevance by 
which testimony may be measured.  But what starts as a 
preliminary diagnosis makes a strong imprint on the 
mind, while all that runs counter to it is received with 
diverted attention.29 
Fuller concluded, therefore, that an adversary presentation by 
advocates on both sides seems “the only effective means for combatting 
                                                          
26 Id. at 1239. 
27 Id. at 1262. 
28 Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (1971); Joint 
Conference on Professional Responsibility, Report, 44 ABA J. 1159 (1958).  For more on this 
subject, see FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS §2.10 (2004). 
29 Fuller, supra note 28, at 34. 
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this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar 
that which is not yet known.”30 
Under Mitchell’s proposal for pattern representation, there is, of 
course,  no possibility of any adversary presentation at all, because it is 
the putative advocate herself who is called upon to “judge too swiftly in 
terms of the familiar that which is not yet known,”31 or, as Mitchell says, 
to decide “quickly, with relatively minimal information.”32  In addition, 
what will be principally known to the lawyer will come from police 
reports, which can have a powerful influence on a decision that is being 
made hastily.33  Moreover, the lawyers who will be making the pattern 
judgments will necessarily be affected by their own backgrounds and 
preconceptions, without the mitigating influence of fact investigation. 
Indeed, Mitchell recognizes—but does not resolve—these difficulties 
in his article.  For example: 
[Mitchell] and a team of students represented a man 
accused of two assaults.  He was physically powerful, 
minimally educated, and black.  The students were 
slight, white, and educated.  The prosecution offered 
what seemed to be a good deal and things looked bad in 
the police reports.  The students wanted to have the 
client take the deal and were annoyed at his resistance.  
In discussions, they clearly thought he was a violent 
thug who was lucky to get the deal.  The client in turn 
was angry and kept telling the students that they 
“weren’t on his side.”  He was right.  They had hardly 
even investigated.34 
That is a typical illustration of how pattern representation works.  In 
that case, however, the client actually got full, rather than pattern, 
representation, and the case took a markedly different turn: 
When [the students did conduct fact investigation], the 
prosecution’s case fell apart.  More importantly, as they 
                                                          
30 Id. 
31 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 1262. 
32 Id.  But see Chandler v. Warden Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) (holding that if a 
defendant does not receive sufficient opportunity to consult with counsel, “the right to be 
heard by counsel would be of little worth”). 
33 This aspect of the problem is illustrated from European practice in FREEDMAN & 
SMITH, supra note 28, at 31-32. 
34 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 1267. 
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got to know the client, they found him to be a man of 
great integrity and decency who was trying his best in 
the violent world in which he lived.35 
In view of the insuperable difficulties of the precipitate judgments 
required by triage, Mitchell’s proposed priorities for making triage 
decisions are unrealistic (and probably not dissimilar from the 
unsystematized decisions that are made in practice already, in both 
misdemeanor and felony cases).  For example, his top priority would go 
to “the factually innocent.”36  However, the defendant in the illustration 
quoted above was factually innocent, but none of the defense lawyers 
believed he was innocent until after fact investigation had been 
conducted—an investigation that never would have happened under 
pattern representation.  Moreover, as Mitchell also acknowledges, as 
soon as defendants learn the rules of triage, they will have a powerful 
incentive to provide information—inaccurate if necessary—that will buy 
them focus representation.37 
How then does Mitchell justify pattern representation under the 
Gideon ideal of the Sixth Amendment?  One answer is that he does not.  
As the title of his article makes clear, he is “Redefining the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Unfortunately, however, Mitchell also makes common 
cause with those judges who have already reduced the Sixth 
Amendment to constitutional hypocrisy.  As he says: 
In short, the Sixth Amendment does not require focus [i.e., “the effort 
one would expect from a good attorney with a reasonable caseload”].  If 
it did, literally every lower court criminal system in the country would 
be constitutionally wanting.  In practice, the Sixth Amendment stands as 
a symbol for the vague notion that representing accused criminals is not 
a bad thing, and serves as a check at the most extreme boundaries of 
attorney competence.38 
Here Mitchell cites Strickland v. Washington.39  In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court held that in order to be “ineffective” under the Sixth 
                                                          
35 Id. at 1267-68. 
36 Id. at 1288. 
37 Id. at 1265.  Next in Mitchell’s order of priorities for focus representation are those 
defendants facing extreme sentences or collateral legal consequences like deportation; cases 
involving systemic injustices, including important evidentiary and procedural issues; and 
cases involving “concrete injustice,” which Mitchell defines vaguely as cases that “touch 
the heart and gut.”  Id. at 1289-1290. 
38 Id. at 1254. 
39 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Amendment, a lawyer must have fallen below “prevailing professional 
norms,” with a “presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”40  Moreover, that 
presumption is a strong one, to which courts are directed to be “highly 
deferential.”41 
Furthermore, under Strickland, even grossly incompetent lawyering 
is not enough to establish ineffective counsel.  In addition, the lawyer’s 
incompetence must have caused “prejudice” to his client, meaning that 
there must be a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”42  Thus, even a reasonable possibility that an innocent person 
might have been wrongly convicted because of his lawyer’s established 
incompetence is not enough to justify a new trial. 
There is, of course, wide scholarly agreement that Strickland has 
neither discouraged incompetent representation nor prevented wrongful 
convictions.43  Mitchell’s reliance on Strickland, reveals, therefore, how 
his promotion of triage encourages public defenders to prostitute the 
ideal of Gideon v. Wainright.44 
If triage, along with pattern representation, is an unethical response 
of public defenders to under-funding, overloading, and the resulting 
incompetent representation, what then is the ethical response?  In order 
to answer that question, we should review the kind of representation 
that is required of lawyers by accepted professional disciplinary rules 
                                                          
40 Id. at 688-89 (emphasis added). 
41 Id. at 689-90. 
42 Id. at 694 (emphasis added). 
43 McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Ten years 
after the articulation of [the Strickland] standard, practical experience establishes that the 
Strickland test, in application, has failed to protect a defendant’s right to be represented by 
something more than ‘a person who happens to be a lawyer.’”); Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 930 n.37 (2003); Adele Bernhard, 
Take Courage:  What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense Services, 63 
U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 346 (2002) (“[A]ll who have seriously considered the question agree 
that Strickland has not worked either to prevent miscarriages of justice or to improve 
attorney performance.”); William S. Geimer, A Decode of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and 
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995) 
(“Strickland has been roundly and properly criticized for fostering tolerance of abysmal 
lawyering.”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1461, 1465 (2003) (“[T]he ruling has proved disabling to the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in practice.”). 
44 I use the word “prostitute” to signify the corrupt mocking of an ideal. 
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and standards.45  And as these rules and standards are catalogued, we 
should keep in mind what “pattern representation” means for 
substantial numbers of hapless defendants—having their cases hastily 
labeled and plea-bargained out by their lawyers with virtually no fact 
investigation or legal research.46 
In contrast to pattern representation, professional standards insist 
that in criminal litigation, as in all other matters, information is essential 
to a lawyer’s decisions and actions.47  The lawyer who is ignorant of the 
facts of the case, therefore, cannot serve the client effectively.48  
Accordingly, defense counsel should conduct a prompt fact 
investigation, exploring all leads to evidence that might prove relevant 
to the case.49 
 This duty to conduct fact investigation is incumbent on the defense 
lawyer even when her client admits facts that appear to constitute guilt, 
and even though the client expresses a desire to plead guilty.50  The 
reason is that the defendant’s belief that he is guilty may be based on 
misconceptions about the law or about what is in his own best interests,51 
and his admissions may not take into account relevant defenses, 
mitigating circumstances, rules of evidence, or constitutional issues.52  
For example, a woman charged with killing her husband assumed that 
she was guilty of murder because she was ignorant of the law relating to 
self-defense.53  Only a lawyer who knows all of the relevant facts is in a 
position to make decisions relating to guilt, lesser offenses, or innocence.  
That decision, therefore, is the lawyer’s responsibility, not the client’s. 
Under no circumstances, therefore, should defense counsel 
recommend to a defendant acceptance of a guilty plea unless appropriate 
investigation and study of the case has been completed, including an 
                                                          
45 In many instances in what follows, quotation marks have been omitted, and 
paraphrasing has been used, for the sake of readability. 
46 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 1262, 1293. 
47 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Std. 4-3.2, Commentary 
[hereinafter DEFENSE FUNCTION]. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. Std. 4-4.1(a); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 5. 
50 DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-4.1(a). 
51 It is not uncommon for an accused to be misinformed about the law and tactics by 
“jail-house lawyers.” 
52 Id. Std. 4-4.2, Commentary. 
53 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 28 at 160. 
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analysis of controlling law as well as the evidence that is likely to be 
introduced at trial.54 
Moreover, the principles underlying the ABA’s Model Rules require 
that the lawyer carry out these obligations zealously, in order to protect 
and pursue all of a client’s legitimate interests.55 
In order to allow zealous investigation and research, defense counsel 
is forbidden to carry a workload that interferes with this minimum 
standard of competence,56 or one that might lead to the breach of other 
professional obligations.57  “The basic rule . . . is that the lawyer’s total 
loyalty is due to each client in each case.”58  This basic rule is violated 
whenever there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider, 
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for a client will 
be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s responsibilities to other 
clients.59  Thus, whenever a lawyer accepts one too many clients—to say 
nothing of 20, 50, or several hundred too many clients—she is involved 
in a conflict of interest, because total loyalty cannot be given to each 
client in each case.  What follows from that is that any new client who 
presents a conflict of interest “must be declined.” 60 
Moreover, a lawyer is required to withdraw from a case if the 
representation will result in a violation of the rules of professional 
conduct or other law.61  Indeed, if a lawyer finds that she has failed to 
provide effective representation, she is required to explain her failure of 
competence to the defendant and to seek to withdraw from the case, 
                                                          
54 DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-6.1(b); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY Std. 
14-3.2(b) [hereinafter PLEAS OF GUILTY]. 
55 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9; see also id. ¶ 2; R 1.3, cmt. 1; DEFENSE 
FUNCTION Std. 4-1.2, Commentary; Std. 4-1.3, Commentary; Std. 4-3.5, Commentary; Std. 4-
8.6, Commentary. 
56 See DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-1.2; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1. 
57 DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-1.3(e); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 2. 
58 DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-3.5, Commentary (emphasis added). 
59 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2); R. 1.7( b) 1; R. 1.7, cmt. 8; see also, 
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 28, at 269-70. 
60 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 3; see also id. R. 6.2 (stating that there is 
good cause to decline an appointment when the representation is likely to result in 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law); id. R. 6.2, cmt. 2; and DEFENSE 
FUNCTION Std. 4-1.6 (stating that there is good cause to decline an appointment when the 
lawyer cannot handle the matter competently); Iacona v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 600, 
604 (E.D. Pa., 1972). 
61 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1); see State ex rel. Escambia County v. 
Behr, 354 So.2d 974 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1978); Ligda v. Super. Ct., 85 Cal. Rptr. 744 (Cal. 
App. 1970); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984). 
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with an explanation to the court of the reason for her motion for leave to 
withdraw.62 
These professional rules and standards make it clear that pattern 
representation, in which the lawyer hastily categorizes cases on the basis 
of insufficient information, is professionally unacceptable.  What then is 
the ethical alternative to responding to the reality of under-funding and 
overloading by some form of triage? 
First, a lawyer who is assigned to represent a client in a criminal 
case, and who is unable to give competent and unconflicted 
representation to that client, is ethically required to decline the 
representation.63 
Second, if the lawyer’s supervisor nevertheless orders her to take the 
case, the supervisor has committed a serious ethical violation,64 and the 
lawyer has an ethical obligation to report the supervisor’s unethical 
conduct to the appropriate disciplinary authority.65 
Third, the lawyer may be required under rules of the court, and 
therefore under ethical rules, to obtain permission of the court to decline 
the assignment.66  However, it would be an ethical violation for a judge 
to order the lawyer to undertake a case in which the lawyer would 
necessarily be violating both the Sixth Amendment and fundamental 
ethical rules relating to competent representation.67  The lawyer would 
therefore be required to report the judge’s unethical conduct to the 
appropriate judicial disciplinary authority.68 
Fourth, the lawyer would be required to put on the record in the case 
the fact that, because of commitments to other clients, the lawyer cannot 
give competent, conflict-free representation to the new client.69  This 
would establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, because the entry of 
                                                          
62 DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-8.6(c). 
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.7(a)(2). 
64 Id. R. 5.1(c)(1). 
65 Id. R. 8.3(a). 
66 Id. R. 1.16(c). 
67 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(2) (“A judge shall be faithful to the law. . . .”); 
Id. Canon 3(B)(7) (“A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a 
proceeding . . . the right to be heard according to law.”); Id. Canon 3(B)(8) cmt. (“A judge 
must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard. . . .”). 
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(b). 
69 See DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-8.2(b), 8.6(c). 
Freedman: An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
922 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
a guilty plea is a critical stage, regardless of whether the charge is a 
felony or a misdemeanor.70 
Fifth, the lawyer would be required to inform the client of any plea 
offer from the prosecutor.71  However, the lawyer would also be required 
to inform the client that her representation of the client cannot be 
performed competently72 and, specifically, that she does not know 
enough about the case to give the client any legal advice.73  Further, she 
would be forbidden to advise the client to accept the plea offer.74 
Sixth, if the client chose to accept the plea offer, the lawyer would be 
required to put on the record that she has not advised the client with 
regard to the plea because to do so would violate her ethical obligations 
of competent and conflict-free representation.75 
What would be accomplished if public defenders and other court-
appointed lawyers did these things?  They would establish compelling 
records of the extent to which the constitutional promise of Gideon is 
being broken.  They would give individual clients grounds to attack their 
sentences directly76 and collaterally.77  They would establish the basis for 
class actions on behalf of their clients and other defendants who have 
similarly been denied the right to counsel.  They would provide the 
news media with dramatic source material for informing the public 
about the failures of the administration of criminal justice.  And they 
would make it more difficult for society and for the established bar to 
continue to deny due process and the effective assistance of counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants. 
The purpose of this article, however, is not pragmatic or tactical.  
Entirely apart from consequentialist justifications, public defenders who 
took these steps would be doing nothing more or less than complying 
with their ethical obligations to their clients and to the administration of 
                                                          
70 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 1387 (2004). 
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4; PLEAS OF GUILTY Std. 14-3.2(a). 
72 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4; DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-3.5(b). 
73 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4. 
74 DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-6.1(b); PLEAS OF GUILTY Std. 14-3.2(b). 
75 See DEFENSE FUNCTION Std. 4-8.2(b), 8.6(c). 
76 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-469 (1997) (noting that a total deprivation 
of counsel is a structural violation requiring reversal without harmless error analysis). 
77 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S. Ct. 564, 568-69, 574 (2004), where the Supreme 
Court was unanimous in recognizing that criminal defendants who plead guilty without 
the benefit of counsel have the right to challenge their sentences and (at least after 
exhausting state remedies) to seek injunctions against the practice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 
see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). 
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justice.78  Even more important, by honoring their ethical obligations, 
public defenders would cease to be an essential part of a fraudulent 
cover-up of the denial of fundamental rights to countless poor people 
who are caught up in a criminal justice system that is unethical, 
unconstitutional, and intolerably cruel.79 
Forty years of constitutional and ethical hypocrisy is enough. 
                                                          
78 “[A] lawyer should seek improvement of . . . the administration of justice and the 
quality of service rendered by the legal profession.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, 
pmb., ¶ 6. 
79 The principal objection to the suggestion that public defenders obey their ethical 
obligations, is that they would jeopardize their jobs.  The concern has basis in fact.  See, e.g., 
Monroe H. Freedman, Third World Justice, LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 11, 1991).  There are three 
responses to that objection.  One is that earning a living for oneself and one’s family is 
indeed a moral responsibility.  A second response, however, is that being a professional 
means putting your professional responsibilities, to your clients and to the administration 
of justice, above your own financial concerns.  The third answer is that if you were to 
suggest to a prostitute that his or her lifestyle is illegal, immoral, and degrading, the 
answer would be, “I have to earn a living.”  Unless the prostitute is spreading diseases, the 
same answer from a public defender is less deserving of sympathy, because the defender 
who is giving ineffective representation is causing a great deal more serious harm to other 
people than is the ordinary prostitute.  This is a harsh indictment, so I should admit to 
complicity.  As a law professor, with full knowledge of the pervasive ethical violations in 
public defender and legal aid offices, I have encouraged students to join those offices as 
“public interest” work. 
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